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VALIDITY OF LEGISLATION CREATING
RESIDENTIAL DISTRICTS
The law-making bodies of our country for the past several
years have been confronted with a concerted agitation for legis-
lation restricting the purposes for which real estate in different
parts of municipalities may be used. This plan aimed principally
at forbidding shops, offices, hotels, factories and other industrial
establishments in strictly residential districts, developed from the
belief that such a plan will better utilize all the real-property in
any given municipality and promote better living conditions.
The average observer undoubtedly does not realize what
legal difficulties these civic promoters encounter, nor within what
narrow limits of legislative action they are confined, because of
the existefice of several well-settled principles of law which can-
not be swept aside for the accommodation of the advancement of
these new plans and ideas.
In touching upon the general powers of a legislature to pass
laws to restrict the uses to which real property may be put or
laws authorizing municipalities to so act. we are at once thrown
into the field of constitutional law.
We are advised by the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal
constitution that no state shall deprive any person of his property
without due process of law and our state constitution provides in
Article I, Section 13, that the property of no person shall be
taken for public use without just compensation therefor.
It must be conceded that a law forbidding a property owner
to build on his property in any manner he desires is an inter-
ference with his property rights and can only be sustained either
(i) under the police power of the state, or (2) as a taking of
private property for public use.
The subject matter, therefore, is divided into two parts and
each will be briefly discussed.
POLICE POWER OF THE STATE.
There, perhaps, is no better explanation of what is meant
by the police power of the state than is found in Redmon vs.
State, 134 Wis. 89, to-wit:
"It would be better to always say that the police power
extends to and permits legislation regulating reasonably
matters appertaining to the public welfare, since anything
beyond thdt must necessarily fall at the threshold of some
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constitutional defense. The doctrine that the police power
is really a law of necessity forms the key, it would seem,
with which to unlock the mysteries, so far as practicable,
of what is within and what is- without the limits of such
power. Not that a police regulation, in form or pretense
to be one, in fact must supply some absolute essential to the
public welfare, but that the exigency to be met must so con-
cern such welfare, be sufficiently vital thereto as to suggest
some reasonable necessity for a remedy affordable only by
a legislative enactment as to efficiently invite public atten-
tion thereto."
We must remember that while it is primarily a legislative
function to pass upon a matter, it nevertheless is a judicial func-
tion to define the proper steps for the exercise of police power
and words in a legislative enactment, no matter how industriously
used to give that act the character of a public regulation, are not
conclusive, for a law is not necessarily one to promote the wel-
fare of the public merely because such is the declared purpose
of its framers.
State vs. Redmon, supra.
Mugler vs. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623.
The important question, therefore, is - Is it necessary for
the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, to prevent industrial establishments of
every kind in specified sections which have been set aside as ex-
clusively residence districts? Is it necessary to enact that sort
of legislation to prevent the infliction of a public injury?
The writer is of the opinion that courts generally will judi-
cially know that a business establishment, such as a grocery or
haberdashery for instance, or any business which is not of a
noxious or offensive character, in any particular block of a
city, is not detrimental to the safety, comfort and health of the
citizens.
The police power is confined to the imposition of those bur-
dens which are necessary to promote the general welfare. In
the exercise of the police power the state is authorized to subject
all occupations to a reasonable regulation, but it is not an arbi-
trary power enabling the legislature to prohibit a business, the
transaction of which inflicts no injury or damage to others.
The question of creating exclusive business and residence dis-
tricts is rather modern, but wrherever it has been attempted that
sort of legislation has been condemned as not being within the
police power of the state.
LEGISLATION CREATING RESIDENTIAL DISTRICTS
The city of Chicago passed an ordinance forbidding retail
stores to be conducted, constructed or located in any block used
exclusively for residence purposes'and in deciding the legality of
that act the Supreme Court of Illinois, in Friend vs. Chicago,
261 Ill. 16, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 438, said:
"There is nothing inherently dangerous to the health
or safety of the public in conducting a retail store. It may
be that in certain exclusively residential districts the owners
of residence property would prefer not to have any retail
stores in such blocks, but, if such be the case, it manifestly
arises solely from esthetic considerations disconnected en-
tirely from any relation to the public health, morals, comfort
or general welfare. Legislation, either by the state or by
municipal corporations, which interferes with private prop-
erty rights or personal liberty cannot be sustained for purely
esthetic purposes."
An ordinance was enacted in Minneapolis prohibiting the
erection of any building, except for residence purposes, within a
certain district. The city has received proper legislative authority
from the state. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, 158 N. W.,
page 1017, decided on July 28th, 1916, that the ordinance was
invalid and that the police power did not extend to the prohibi-
tion of innocent and legitimate business.
It has been uniformly held that ordinances or statutes re-
quiring the closing of business places where merchandise is
bought or sold after a certain hour in the day are invalid.
Saville vs. Corless, L. R. A. 1916 A.
If no such interference with the rights of ownership and
domination over one's property can be exercised, is it not natural
to infer that entire prohibition to engage in such business can-
not be upheld?
From these citations it can be seen that the primary motive
for this legislation is the desire to satisfy the esthetic taste, which
is a matter beyond the control of the police power of the state.
TAKING OF PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE.
It would appear, therefore, that if laws enacted restricting
the use to which property is put in certain localities are to be up-
held, it must be done under the right of eminent domain.
Eminent domain of course implies compensation and unless
the statute provides a method of compensation to the owner of
property the statute must fall.
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It must also be borne in mind that the state or municipal
corporation can only take property for public use. Public use is
not "use by the public" for if it were, eminent domain might be
applied to selecting sites for theaters to which the public has the
right of access without discrimination. Nor is public use synony-
mous with "public advantage" or what the legislature might deem
to be the public advantage. Public use is a taking to enable the
government to carry on its public function and to conserve the
safety and health of the public and for the purpose of enabling
the municipal corporation to provide the public with some neces-
sity or convenience which is required by the public as such.
It is somewhat difficult to satisfy one's self to the belief that
the prohibition to a property owner to build on his property in
a certain district gives the municipality a "public use" of that
property right.
It has been uniformly held that a taking for esthetic purposes
is not one for a public use.
Freund on Police Power, Par. i8I.
To constitute a taking of property it is not necessary that
the real estate itself be taken. Restricting the use or enjoyment
of property is a taking.
City of Janesville vs. Carpenter, 77 Wis. 288.
Our own state has grappled with this agitation and has en-
acted several laws along this line. One of them is Section 67o-1,
Revised Statutes of Wisconsin, which authorizes counties having
a population of one hundred fifty thousand or more (Milwaukee
County), to restrict certain portions of their territory to be used
exclusively for business, factory or residential purposes. It is
interesting to note the following unique phraseology in the act:
"The enactment of such ordinances shall be deemed a find-
ing and declaration to the effect that such districting will protect,
promote and conserve the public health, convenience and morals."
That sentence undoubtedly was inserted to try to show that the
act is a regulation under the police power. Undoubtedly not feel-
ing satisfied that the statute is valid under the police power, the
legislature also provided a method of compensation to the owners
whose property is affected. From the general discussion above
and because of the method of compensation it is questionable
whether that act can stand the test of constitutionality.
LEGISLATION CREATING RESIDENTIAL DISTRICTS
The Session Laws of 1917 reveal an enactment amending
Section 959-I7e whereby every city is authorized to regulate and
restrict the location of trades and industries and the location of
buildings designed for specified uses and to establish districts of
such number, shape and area as such city may deem best suited
to carry out the purposes of that section. It further provides that
such regulation and act shall not prohibit the continuance of the
use of any building for any trade or industry for which such
building or premises are used at the time such ordinances take
effect. No compensation for damages is provided.
Under this law it would seem that it was intended that the
cities are to restrict the location of trades under the police power
inasmuch as no compensation is provided for, and because of the
following words in said act: "Such districts and regulations
shall be prescribed by ordinances which shall be designed to pro-
mote the public health, safety and general welfare." If then we
assume that it is necessary to prohibit industrial occupations to
preserve the health, morals and convenience of the commtinity
and if such business places are dangerous, how then can it be
said that existing businesses can be conducted? It would seem
that the very fact that the law sanctions the continuance of exist-
ing business places nullifies and declares absurd any contention
that a business place is dangerous to the community and for that
reason ought to be prohibited.
From the foregoing it seems clear that the statute cannot be
sustained under the police power and it is also evident that, inas-
much as no compensation is made to the owners of the property
affected, the law cannot be upheld under the power to acquire
private property for public use under the law of eminent domain.
It will be seen that this entire question, which at first appears
to contain few difficulties, is in fact a very big and important
question. In view of the fact that there is a national agitation
for the separation of business places from residence districts
and that people generally recognize that a business district is
not the best place for a family home, it is problematical whether
or not the courts hereafter will adopt the view that the considera-
tion that prompts this class of legislation is only partly esthetic,
and in a far greater measure purely practical so as to justify a
broader conception of the police power.
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